Dec 30 2009

Waiting for the Other Spur to Drop

Phil Londen

The San Antonio Spurs are struggling this season. For a franchise that has been synonymous with winning over the past decade, the Spurs are having a disappointing season despite being 17-11 (.607 W-L%) and very much in the playoff mix. Their 33 year old franchise player, Tim Duncan, is still putting up numbers consistent with his career averages while also posting a career high in free throw percentage. However, being a middle of the pack playoff team is not a successful season for a team that has won four out of the last eleven championships.

Throughout these four championship seasons, there have been two constants: the aforementioned once-in-a-decade franchise player, Tim Duncan, and the second best active head coach in the NBA, Gregg Popovich. It is impossible to talk about either one of these two mythical figures in isolation, as their careers are so intertwined with Pop’s first full season as head coach of the Spurs being Duncan’s rookie season. In fact, it wouldn’t be surprising at all to see Pop and Duncan retire at the same time (2011 at the earliest, although 2012 is more realistic).

Each of the Spurs’ four championships was predicated on their defensive prowess, as orchestrated by Pop and anchored by Duncan. Everything else is built around supporting stars (Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili now; Sean Elliott and David Robinson earlier) and role players (Antonio McDyess and Roger Mason now; Bruce Bowen and Robert Horry earlier). The Spurs’ genius lies in blending the franchise player, supporting stars and role players together into a defensive juggernaut and an above-average offensive team.

Take a look at the following table, which looks at all of the Duncan-led Spurs. It compares the Spurs’ offense (O-Rating, or points scored per 100 possessions), defense (D-Rating, or points allowed per 100 possessions) and the Differential between the two (O-Rating minus D-Rating equals Differential; the higher the positive number the better). The table also lists the average O-Rating/D-Rating for each season, as it varies from year to year, and the individual rankings for each O-Rating and D-Rating.

*Table is sortable. Click on column headers to sort data.

SeasonAVGO-RATRKD-RATRKDIFF
1997-98105.0103.817th99.42nd4.4
1998-99*~102.2104.011th95.01st9.0
1999-00104.1105.012th98.62nd6.4
2000-01103.0106.66th98.01st8.6
2001-02104.5106.59th99.72nd6.8
2002-03*103.6105.67th99.73rd5.9
2003-04102.9102.216th94.11st8.1
2004-05*106.1107.59th98.81st8.7
2005-06106.2107.310th99.61st7.7
2006-07*106.5109.25th99.92nd9.3
2007-08107.5107.215th101.83rd5.4
2008-09108.3108.513th104.35th4.2
2009-10106.4111.15th105.514th5.6

* Championship season
~ Lockout-shortened season

Perusing the chart, the defensive numbers jump off the page. They were a top five defensive team in every season leading up to this year with Duncan. This season, the Spurs have dropped to 14th overall, which is the first time a Duncan era Spurs team has been an average defensive team instead of an elite defensive team. On the offensive side of things, the Spurs have been an average offensive team only finishing in the top five once (it will be twice if the Spurs continue to play at this exact level all season).

The Spurs’ philosophy has always been that an average offense is fine as long as the defense is elite, which leads to a high differential. Notice that if you sort the chart descending according to differential three of the Spurs’ four championships cluster near the top? It is most certainly not a coincidence.

Now take a look at the Spurs’ current season, which can be referred to as their Bizarro Season. This season, the formula for the Spurs has been flipped on it’s head, with the Spurs being a top five offensive team and average defensive team. Notice that the Spurs still have a decent positive differential but remember that the fundamental formula for this Spurs team has changed somewhat radically from all previous Duncan-led Spurs.

What is responsible for this flipping of the proverbial script?

Let’s look at the personnel turnover from last season to this season to see which players were holdovers, which players were subtracted and which players were added.

Holdovers: Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, Tony Parker, Roger Mason, Matt Bonner, George Hill, Michael Finley

In this group, we have our franchise player, supporting stars and four of the Spurs’ key role players from last season. Hill has solidified his role as backup point guard and efficient scorer off the bench. Mason has stepped in as the third string point guard and has also filled the void left by Big Shot Rob. Finley’s role this season has been drastically reduced (18.3 minutes per game), although he can fill in at either the two or three if injuries should require it. Bonner plays the role of the stretch four, spotting up for threes in the corners and looking to clean the glass.

Subtracted: Kurt Thomas, Ime Udoka, Bruce Bowen, Fabricio Oberto, Drew Gooden, Jacque Vaughn

This group is all role players, almost all of which are above average to excellent defenders, either on the perimeter or in the post. Thomas is the consummate professional who plays extremely smart post defense and is an excellent role model for younger bigs. Oberto is like a watered down version of Thomas; together they represent a large exodus of post defense and veteran savvy. Gooden was more of an offensive-focused big man than Kurt or Fabricio but is still an average defender as well. Bowen is the quintessential Spurs perimeter defender, although it was clear he had lost a step last season. Udoka was also a solid defender and was relatively versatile, as he was able to guard the perimeter or the post. Finally, Vaughn was a decent defender at the point and was a solid fill-in to spell Parker off the bench. In all, the Spurs lost a ton of defensive minded role players.

Added: Richard Jefferson, DeJuan Blair, Antonio McDyess, Keith Bogans, Theo Ratliff

The Spurs gained one borderline supporting star/role player and four other role players to try and fill the void left by the outgoing players. R-Jeff has the physical skill-set to be a lock-down defender, although he has traditionally made his name through his offense. Blair is a promising rookie, who will be a destructive force on the glass for his career. However, he is still young and plays for Popovich, who is hesitant to play rookies big minutes. Bogans has started for the Spurs and is being groomed to take over for Bowen, locking his man down on defense and spotting up for the corner three and making opposing defenses pay for doubling off of him. Ratliff and McDyess were brought in on minimum contracts to man the paint and bring the veteran savvy that Kurt and Fabricio Oberto provided.

Let’s run down the list one more time to look for changes. Same coach (Pop). Same franchise player (Duncan). Same supporting stars (Parker and Manu). No difference here. But when you examine role players, here is where big changes start to become apparent. They have replaced departed perimeter defenders (Udoka, Bowen) with fresh perimeter defenders (Jefferson, Bogans). They have replaced post defenders (Thomas, Oberto, Gooden) with fresh post defenders (McDyess, Ratliff, Blair).

However, just swapping these players out has not been as seamless as a transition as the Spurs front office and other observers probably expected. Something was lost in translation and the Spurs’ defense has stumbled out of the gates. Recently, Coach Popovich summed up what was lost very nicely.

Still, Spurs coach Gregg Popovich remains bullish on the team’s offseason investments. He continues to urge patience with his newcomers as they adjust to their new team, and their new team adjusts to them.

“What I’m learning is we lost more corporate knowledge than I thought,” said Popovich, whose team is 13-10 after a 2-1 Western road trip. “It’s taken a little bit more time than I thought to get everybody on the same page.”

Source: San Antonio Express-News

The corporate knowledge that Pop is talking about above is what was lost. The replacement players are all capable individual defenders but have no experience playing in the Spurs defensive system. Spurs defense is position defense that demands crisp defensive rotations that can only be effective when executed as a unit. If any of the five men on the floor are out of sync then the entire defense crumbles and opposing teams can take advantage of weaknesses. The study of this season’s Spurs illustrates not only the importance of role players but also the importance of having continuity with your role players from season-to-season.

As a die-hard Suns fan, I’ve learned one lesson over the years when dealing with the San Antonio Spurs: never under any circumstances underestimate them or count them out. As history has shown, Popovich is a brilliant coach and is one man that is capable of rising to the challenge of getting his team to play to the best of their abilities, especially on the defensive end of the floor. If Pop and Duncan can get their team firing on all cylinders in time for the Playoffs, San Antonio is going to be a very difficult matchup for anyone in the Western Conference.

SeasonAVGO-RATRKD-RATRKDIFF
1997-98105.0103.817th99.42nd4.4
1998-99*~102.2104.011th95.01st9.0
1999-00104.1105.012th98.62nd6.4
2000-01103.0106.66th98.01st8.6
2001-02104.5106.59th99.72nd6.8
2002-03*103.6105.67th99.73rd5.9
2003-04102.9102.216th94.11st8.1
2004-05*106.1107.59th98.81st8.7
2005-06106.2107.310th99.61st7.7
2006-07*106.5109.25th99.92nd9.3
2007-08107.5107.215th101.83rd5.4
2008-09108.3108.513th104.35th4.2
2009-10106.4111.15th105.514th5.6

Jun 23 2009

A Look Back at the 2008 Draft

Phil Londen

Mock drafts often seem like such pointless endeavors. The minute a team trades up or down, the sanctity of the entire mock has been violated. And this year, it is almost a guarantee that there will be movement on Thursday with many teams more focused on shedding salary instead of trying to improve. So instead of trying to predict that which cannot be predicted, let’s take a look at last year’s draft.

How will the class of 2008 be remembered when compared against the greatest classes of all time? 2003? 1996? 1984? One year later and the draft class of 2008 is looking very strong but definitely has a long ways to go before being mentioned in the same sentence as the aforementioned draft classes.

2008 NBA Draft

  1. Derrick Rose
  2. Michael Beasley
  3. O.J. Mayo
  4. Russell Westbrook
  5. Kevin Love
  6. Danilo Gallinari
  7. Eric Gordon
  8. Joe Alexander
  9. D.J. Augustin
  10. Brook Lopes
  11. Jerryd Bayless
  12. Jason Thompson
  13. Brandon Rush
  14. Anthony Randolph
  15. Robin Lopez
  16. Marreese Speights
  17. Roy Hibbert
  18. JaVale McGee
  19. J.J. Hickson
  20. Alexis Ajinca
  21. Ryan Anderson
  22. Courtney Lee
  23. Kosta Koufas
  24. Serge Ibaka
  25. Nicolas Batum
  26. George Hill
  27. Darrell Arthur
  28. Donte Greene
  29. DJ White
  30. JR Giddens

Second round notables: Mario Chalmers (#34), DeAndre Jordan (#35), Luc Richard Mbah a Moute (#37), Chris Douglas-Roberts (#40), Sean Singletary (#42), Goran Dragic (#45), Bill Walker (#47), Mike Taylor (#55).

Besides a few head turners, the first round is stacked from top to bottom with guys who made an immediate impact in the NBA. That is a rare phenomenon in draft history. Looking back one year later we start to see which players might end up being busts and which players might end up being steals.

Potential Busts

As far as biggest busts (so far) of the 2008 NBA Draft, both Danilo Gallinari or Joe Alexander are making strong cases to be considered 2008’s top bottom dog. While it is clearly too early to be writing their professional basketball obituaries, both players are hindered by their high draft position (6th and 8th overall, respectively). Gallinari should probably be considered the second biggest bust after Alexander for two reasons.

First, Gallinari had legitimate medical reasons for not performing well in his rookie season (reoccurring back injury). With the back injury almost totally behind him, Gallinari now has to prove that he should not be considered a bust and that he belongs in the league. He has to take those flashes of brilliance he has shown on the court and turn them into consistent production. And second, Gallinari has an amazing nickname: The Rooster. If that doesn’t convince you that Joe Alexander should be considered a bigger bust, I don’t know what will.

Joe Alexander, on the other hand, does not have such convenient excuses. If you look at Alexander’s stats by position, he was clearly outplayed by his his opponent on the other team. Regardless of whether he played the three or four, Alexander ended up being a negative for the Bucks. He was less bad playing the four than the three but he was thoroughly outplayed (The Rooster’s stats by position for comparison’s sake).

In an interesting development, the Buck’s just traded Richard Jefferson to the Spurs for the carcasses (and expiring contracts) of Bruce Bowen, Fabricio Oberto and Kurt Thomas. In addition, Milwaukee moved Oberto to the Pistons for Amir Johnson. That just cleared up about 35 minutes per game at the small forward position and brought in more competition at the four. Obviously salary relief was one major concern for the Bucks, but they are also trying to free up some playing time for Alexander in order to try and prove that he wasn’t a total bust.

Steals of the Draft

One of the biggest steals of the draft came when New Jersey selected Brook Lopez with the tenth pick overall. Playing for a New Jersey Nets team in total transition, Lopez has been better than advertised and may end up being one of the top players in the 2008 Class. Before getting into it, let’s just get the obligitory Brook and Robin Lopez comparison out of the way. Now we can move on.

In looking at Brook stats from his rookie year, there are a couple of things that jump out. First, and most importantly, is his efficieny for a big man. Anytime you have a legit seven footer that shoots 53 percent from the field and 79 from the line it is a very good thing. Second, his block totals are very nice (1.9 per game) for a rookie center in the NBA and contain great promise. If you drafted Brook Lopez in your fantasy leagues last season, congratulations; you probably have a nice (fantasy) trophy to show for it.

The second biggest steal of the draft (22nd overall) may have actually come from the late second round: Orlando’s Courtney Lee. Lee played a pivotal role in the Magic’s NBA Finals appearance this season despite being remembered more for his missed shots. Lee will probably end up being a very solid player in the league and has already shown his all-around game. He can shoot, defend, pass the ball and take it to the rack and played very confident basketball during most of the regular season.

Second Round Studs

As in every draft, there are a handful of guys taken in the second round that turn out to have solid careers. Rashard Lewis and Gilbert Arenas are probably the two most commonly cited examples. The first player who might fit that bill is Mario Chalmers. Chalmers (selected34th  overall) did an admirable job as a rookie point guard for the Heat and helped get them into the Playoffs after a very disappointing season in 2007-08. That shooting guard of theirs might have had something to do with their playoff appearance as well…

The final potential second round stud is little-known Luc Richard Mbah a Moute. Despite being offensively challenged, Mbah a Moute (drafted 37th overall) has found a way to stay on the court: through solid defense. On a team coached by Scott Skiles, that is pretty much all you need to earn a steady spot in the rotation. As Luc develops, he has the potential to develop into a valuable player in the league. For where he was taken in the draft, Luc should definitely outperform expectations.

There is an overall lesson that can be taken from looking back at past drafts. It doesn’t matter where your draft pick is; value can be found throughout the draft. What really matters is who is doing the picking. Isn’t it strange that certain teams seem to always kill the draft no matter where their picks are? What is really important is to have good management that does their due diligence. The scouting, the workouts, and the numbers are what really separates a team that sees the diamond in the rough from the team that goes for the flavor of the week.